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Abstract: We provide a brief summary of two areas where cross-fertilization across
economics and other disciplines is likely to have far-reaching benefits. The increasing
concern about research reproducibility entails that economic design has much to contribute to
the discussion of possible reforms in science, while the empirical discipline of meta-research
can inform practices to assess the validity of the economics literature. A mutual investment in
investigating possible synergies may be costly but could benefit the scientific endeavour as a
whole.
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21. The Reproducibility Crisis and Resulting Initiatives
Just as chemical engineers are called upon not merely to understand the principles that govern chemical
plants, but to design them, and just as physicians aim not merely to understand the biological causes of
disease, but their treatment and prevention, a measure of the success of microeconomics will be the extent
to which it becomes the source of practical advice, solidly grounded in well tested theory, on designing
the institutions through which we interact with one another.
(Roth, 1991, p. 113)
Increasing concern about the reproducibility of scientific findings has been raised in the
recent years. The relevant discussion has been particularly heated in academia – especially in
biomedical and psychological disciplines (e.g., Ioannidis, 2005, 2012; Prinz et al., 2011;
Open Science Initiative, 2015; Simmons et al., 2011) – and the popular press has followed up,
with articles in outlets such as the Economist, the New Yorker and the New York Times. It
should be emphasized that the aforementioned disciplines have a long empirical tradition in
assessing how knowledge accumulates, having been pioneers in the field of meta-analysis
(e.g., Cochran, 1937; Glass, 1976; Bero and Rennie, 1995). Hence, it is not clear that more
discussion of the reproducibility of findings in these disciplines entails the existence of a
larger problem relative to other fields. It could simply reflect a different research focus.
The accumulated empirical evidence has led researchers in these disciplines to pay
increasing attention to researcher incentives (e.g., Bakker et al., 2012; Nosek et al., 2012;
Ioannidis, 2014), with a focus on how to improve research practices. A deeper analysis of
incentives was left aside, however, given the urgency of the problem, and plausible intuitive
solutions were proposed in order to enhance transparency and reduce researchers’ bias and
degrees-of-freedom (e.g., Simmons et al., 2011; Landis et al., 2012; Nosek et al., 2012;
Fanelli, 2013; Miguel et al., 2014). A series of reforms was accordingly implemented, with
the most important ones being the imposition of reporting guidelines, open data, and
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Eich, 2014; Collins et al., 2014; McNutt, 2014). As far as we know, rigorous policy
assessment did not take place, although ex-post studies have found some evidence of success
(e.g., Kane et al., 2007; Kaplan and Irving, 2015; Kindwell et al., 2016).
In several other disciplines there is an active discussion whether similar policies
should be imposed (e.g., Nyhan, 2015; Maniadis et al., 2014, 2015; Cook, 2016; Byington
and Felps, 2017), but the relative deficit in quantitative research synthesis makes this
assessment difficult (but, in social sciences, note the seminal work of Franco et al., 2014). In
economics, there is empirical work (particularly recent) on the reproducibility of economic
findings, pointing in different directions, and with some subfields faring better than others. In
pioneering work, Dewald et al. (1986), and Delong and Lang (1992) estimated both ‘methods
reproducibility’2 and the false negatives rate in economics. However, only recently have
economists returned to the issue. Chang and Li (2015) found that reproducibility has
improved since 1986, but with plenty of room for further improvement. Brodeur et al. (2016)
analysed statistical tests reported in top economic journals and found a pattern of p-values
indicating considerable bias. On the other hand, the replication initiative by Camerer et al.
(2016) provides evidence that experimental economics fares relatively well regarding
replicability. In addition, there have been already new important policy initiatives: for
instance, top economics journals require posting data and code for accepted papers and the
Journal of the Economics Science Association (devoted to the use of experimental methods in
economics) was launched also to promote reproducibility (Nikiforakis and Slonim, 2015).
We posit that this state of affairs generates a double opportunity for cross-fertilization
between economics and other empirical disciplines. Two major challenges are common to all
disciplines: 1) how to measure the degree of reproducibility; 2) how to understand
2 This concept has been recently defined as ‘… the provision of enough detail about study procedures and data
so the same procedures could, in theory or in actuality, be exactly repeated’. (Goodman et al., 2016, p.2)
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argued before, considerable resources have been put into policy reforms that lack rigorous
evaluation. This is where economics can help: researchers from afflicted disciplines should
be interested in the insights offered by rigorous economic tools, especially design economics.
The contribution by Di Tillio et al. (forthcoming) published in this journal issue illustrates
this approach from a theory viewpoint. On the other hand, by applying (whenever
disciplinary differences allow) empirical methods from the emerging discipline of meta-
research (Ioannidis et al., 2015) economists can systematically assess how the field of
economics fares in terms of reproducibility. In this same journal issue, Ioannidis et al.
(forthcoming) and Maniadis et al. (forthcoming) contribute in this aspect by examining
whether and how economics can benefit from meta-research methods.
2. Economics of Science and Design Economics
Economic methodology can bring clarity to the examination of mechanisms behind the
reproducibility crisis and to the systematic evaluation of possible policy solutions. The study
of behavioural responses to incentives embodied in institutions is not the main focus of most
scientific disciplines. Hence, there is a clear role for economic methods in assessing reform
proposals by examining systematically the trade-offs and interdependencies of researcher
behaviour in the scientific environment. In particular, we believe that there is considerable
promise in economic design (Roth, 2002), that is, the combination of mathematical modelling
and experiments used in assessing the effects of policy and institutional changes. Gall et al.
(2017) forcefully argue this point to a biomedical audience by reviewing relevant work in
economics. We shall now go over some of the key contributions briefly, delving in more
detail into the contribution of Di Tillio et al. (forthcoming).
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researchers in an incentive-compatible and cost-effective manner. A useful class of games for
analysing this type of interaction is persuasion games (Milgrom, 2008). A sender provides
verifiable information to a receiver, having an incentive to affect her behaviour. If everybody
knows the sender’s set of possible messages, the (rational) receiver anticipates the sender’s
exaggeration and infers the truth. Thus, there is no need for external intervention to improve
knowledge accumulation. Henry and Ottaviani (2017) study the possible policies of receivers,
such as medical authorities in drug approval procedures, who may commit to approve any
drug if the success rate in trials exceeds a threshold level chosen by the authority. Again,
rational authorities will expect the sender to choose the number of trials strategically and
choose a reasonably conservative approval threshold. Henry (2009) examines a setup where
the sender first determines how much research to perform and then what to disclose to the
receiver, yielding incentives to conduct excessively many trials and to selectively report
results. If the receiver understands these strategic considerations, it follows that in any
equilibrium of the game the sender conducts an excessive number of trials and, perhaps
slightly surprisingly, reveals all trial results.
Di Tillio et al. (forthcoming) attack directly the problem of information revelation in
science. They consider the case of a researcher who aims at persuading an evaluator to grant
approval of a treatment. The researcher implements an experiment with two conditions: a
treatment and a baseline condition. The evaluator observes the experimental findings and,
based on how convincing the evidence is, decides whether or not to approve the treatment.
While the researcher always benefits from acceptance, the evaluator does so only when the
benefit of acceptance outweighs its cost. The researcher has access to pre-existing private
information, based on which they can take unobservable actions to make the evidence more
convincing. In particular, they can do one of the following: (i) sample subjects conditional on
6their treatment effect; (ii) assign subjects to conditions based on their baseline levels; (iii)
selectively report the findings of the experiment. By taking any of these unobservable actions,
the researcher manipulates the experiment (or its report) and induces a form of persuasion
bias. The welfare implications of such bias are subtle. Despite the bias, the researcher’s
strategic manipulation introduces additional information to the system and, thus, the
evaluator may be better off relatively to the case with no bias. However, the evaluator
responds strategically to the researcher’s behaviour by raising their standard of acceptance
and, in equilibrium the researcher may be worse off relatively to the case with no bias. In fact,
the researcher may find themselves in a confidence trap in which, if possible, they would
rather prefer to commit themselves to no manipulation given the scepticism of the evaluator,
who places very low confidence in the provided experimental evidence.
Lacetera and Zirulia (2011) find that policies purported to reduce the cost of
monitoring or increase the rewards of successful publication can have different implications,
which depend on the exact parameters of the model. Park et al. (2014) focus on the fact that
learning by observation in the research arena can result to fads and herding. Accordingly,
keeping the element of subjectivity in reviewers’ recommendation can be beneficial because
it safeguards against these problematic phenomena. Gall and Maniadis (2015) directly model
the effect of journals imposing reporting guidelines in a tournament environment and robustly
find that this policy supresses the overall rate of misrepresentation of research information.
Felgenhauer and Schulte (2014) focus on the costs and benefits of experimentation. One
conclusion from their analysis is that empirical evidence provided across different journals
and disciplines should be assigned a different informational weight. For instance, in
disciplines where generating new evidence is inexpensive and for articles submitted in elite
journals, a much more conservative standard needs to be imposed.
7Plott (1994) illustrates the principle that theoretical methods for assessing policies
need to be complemented by empirical evidence, and in particular that experiments can be
used as a ‘testbed’ to address the effects of institutional change. This approach often involves
‘horse races’ among several alternative institutions and it has been used to assess various
real-life institutional challenges. It is well known that the design approach has had
considerable success in several domains, including auction and market design and
environmental policy (e.g., Ledyard et al., 1997; Plott, 1997; Kagel and Roth, 2000; Cason et
al., 2003). The ‘testbed approach’ can be used to attack the problem of optimal reforms of
research practices, allowing for a wide spectrum of experimentation ranging from laboratory
validations of policy changes to randomised control trials in the field.
3. What Can Economics Learn from Meta-Research?
From an empirical perspective, one might ask whether economics itself suffers from the
reproducibility problem. Ioannidis and Doucouliagos (2013) argue that the problem may
affect economics, but much remains unknown. First of all, are there similarities between
economics and experimental biomedical and behavioural sciences? It has been argued that
with the evolution of experimental economics and recent advances in microeconometrics,
empirical microeconomics now hinges much more on the experimental method (Angrist and
Pischke, 2010). If so, it is worth examining whether economics can learn from the study of
factors that affect the reproducibility of empirical – mainly experimental – research, which
constitutes a discipline in its own right: meta-research.
This discipline has developed a varied methodology: metrics of how biased the
published scientific evidence is (Ioannidis and Trikalinos 2007; Simmons et al. 2013),
quantitative analysis of how knowledge accumulates over time (Cooper et al., 2009), and
assessments of the fraction of findings that correspond to false positives (Wacholder et al,
82004; Ioannidis 2005). To illustrate further, let us focus on psychology. Cohen (1962)
analysed the 1960 volume of the ‘Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology’, and found a
median power equal to 0.48. Bakker et al. (2012) provided a more general power estimate
equal to 0.35. A similar tradition exists in quantifying the publication bias, the file-drawer
problem, and the rate of ‘results reproducibility.’3 Bakker et al. (2012) provided quantitative
evidence regarding the degree of selection and publication bias, finding indications of biases
and excess significant results in 7 out of 13 meta-analyses they considered. Moreover,
Cooper et al. (1997) found that the fraction of studies that are not submitted for publication
following data analysis exceeds 60%. Makel et al. (2012) examined the 100 most cited
psychology journals and estimated the percentage of them that represent replications. They
found that about 1% are replications, most of which are successful; about 80% of the total
replications are conceptual rather than exact replications.
In economics, analogous evidence is scarce. Zhang and Ortmann (2013) estimated a
median power of 0.25 for experimental studies of the dictator game included in Engel’s (2011)
meta-analysis. Duvendack et al. (2015) review replications in economics – but in non-random
design that makes it difficult to understand how common replication is. These are important
first steps, but much more needs to be done in terms of examining whether meta-research
methods for retrospectively estimating power and assessing results reproducibility can be
successfully employed in economics. This is where the studies of Ioannidis et al.
(forthcoming) and Maniadis et al. (forthcoming) contribute to fill important gaps.
Ioannidis et al. (forthcoming) examine quantitatively 159 meta-analyses relating to
different empirical areas of economics research (e.g., labour economics, macroeconomics,
etc.) to calculate the proportion of reported findings that are adequately powered. The authors
employ four alternative meta-analytical approaches in order to obtain conservative and robust
3 This is defined as ‘obtaining the same results from the conduct of an independent study whose procedures are
as closely matched to the original experiment as possible’. (Goodman et al., 2016, pp. 2-3).
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that empirical research in economics is generally underpowered with half of the economics’
areas surveyed having 10.5% or less of their studies adequately powered. The median
statistical power in empirical economics research turns out to be not larger than 18%. An
important implication of the overall inadequate power of empirical research in economics is
that a sizable majority of its studies have less than 50% probability of detecting the
phenomenon under investigation. The authors also introduce a novel meta-analytical
approach to discount for the existence of a possible bias in empirical economics research.
Contrary to the standard practice in meta-analyses of including each and every available
study, they estimate the empirical effect in a given area (or sub-area) of research by including
only adequately powered studies, while discarding all the others. Arguably, such a meta-
analytical approach is likely to reduce the research bias leading to the stark finding that
almost 80% of the empirical effects reported are importantly inflated.
Maniadis et al. (forthcoming) apply both theoretical and empirical meta-research
methods to economics research, focusing on replication. They first extend the Ioannidis (2005)
framework and examine how independent replications can affect the relevant Post-Study
Probability (ܲܵܲ ) that a result is true and how potential bias in the conduct of replications
affects inference. Adversarial (sympathetic) bias means that a fixed fraction of time in which
a replication study should be declared positive (negative), is declared negative (positive)
instead. Suppose a positive result has recently been discovered, and there are several
replication attempts. The model finds that in disciplines with adversarial regimes, society’s
updating on the basis of a fixed number of replications should be larger relative to a
discipline with neutral researchers, and much larger than in disciplines with sympathetic
replicators. Moreover, when one looks at mixed evidence ex post, higher average power does
not necessarily increase our confidence in a phenomenon being true. The authors then
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conduct a pilot empirical study focusing on experimental economics. By reviewing a large
sample of studies, they estimate the prevalence of replications in the literature and study the
determinants of ‘replication success’. In doing so, they reveal the challenges of doing
systematic meta-research in economics also because of the scarce use of the term
‘replication’. Overall, the results are compatible with the psychological meta-research article
of Makel et al. (2012). However, standardization of terminology and systematization is
needed for future systematic meta-research attempts. Since these are costly activities, it seems
that further investment is needed to convince the economic audience for the added value of
meta-research.
4. Conclusions
Often disciplinary boundaries artificially restrict interaction and cross-fertilization that may
be greatly beneficial. This is especially the case for scientific issues that interest many
disciplines. The alleged ‘crisis of reproducibility’ is a case in point. We delimitate two lines
of possibly fruitful interdisciplinary interaction: first, design economics can potentially be
useful to help assess how to induce researchers to follow practices that enhance
reproducibility. Second, empirical methods from the emerging discipline of meta-research
have the promise of enhancing our understanding of the reproducibility of economics.
The articles of the current issue illustrate these two areas of potential cross-
fertilization. However, the empirical work of Maniadis et al. (forthcoming) offers a
cautionary tale, showing that we should not be overly confident that methods seamlessly
translate across disciplines.
University of Southampton
University of Nottingham
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